Many studies have been conducted on hearing pupils' understanding of science. Findings from these studies have been used as grounds for planning instruction in school science. This article reports findings from an interview study of how deaf pupils in compulsory school reason about phenomena in a science context. The results reveal that there is variation in the extent to which pupils use scientific principles for reasoning about science phenomena. For some pupils, school science seems to have little to offer as a framework for reasoning. The results also generate questions about the need in school instruction of deaf and hard-of-hearing pupils to consider the specific teaching and learning situations in a deaf environment.
Stockholm Institute of Education (SIE) was mandated by the Swedish government to plan and implement education programs for teachers of deaf and hard-ofhearing pupils. In consequence, SIE decided in 1998 to design a program for educating mathematics and science teachers of deaf and hard-of-hearing pupils in compulsory school. After a year of planning, the program got under way in August 1999.
Compulsory School Education for Deaf and Hard-ofHearing Pupils
There are five regional schools for deaf and hard-ofhearing pupils in Sweden. Some 600 pupils were enrolled in these schools in 1999. In addition, some deaf and hard-of-hearing pupils were mainstreamed into the regular compulsory school system.
The regular compulsory school conducts a 9-year program, whereas special schools for deaf and hard-ofhearing pupils spread achievement targets over 10 years. Swedish sign language (SSL) is the primary language in the special schools. The curriculum for sign language states: "Sign language plays a key role in the special school. It enhances pupils' thinking and creativity. Through language, knowledge becomes visible and functional" (Skolverket, 1996, p. 117, our translation) . In schools for deaf and hard-of-hearing children, Swedish is intended to be "a functional complement to sign language. . . . Instruction should promote their [the pupils] development toward becoming bilingual with sign language as their first language and written Swedish as their second" (Skolverket, 1996, p. 101, our translation) . Both schools for deaf and hard-of-hearing pupils and regular compulsory schools use the same curriculum in science and mathematics.
The new teacher education program at SIE was explicitly targeted for schools for deaf and hard-ofhearing pupils. An important question in planning the program was: does teaching and learning in a context received instruction presenting scientifically correct explanations. Based on the findings in this research tradition, an instructional goal would be to present situations in which pupils abandon or revise initial conceptions in favor of more formally correct scientific explanations through a conceptual change (Driver & Easley, 1978 , Fensham, Gunstone, & White, 1994 Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982) .
Learning as Operating in Different Domains
Later research has shed light on how emotional, social, and situational aspects influence pupils' learning in science. Solomon (1989; see also 1983) argues that outside school, pupils are continually being socialized to a repertoire of unscientific models of explanations through the media, family, and peers. Because this kind of social knowledge is valid for communication in everyday contexts, it does not disappear in favor of formal scientific explanation. Consequently, learning science is a question of learning to keep separate and reason within two domains of knowledge (cf. Caravita & Halldén, 1994) . Solomon uses the terms life-world domain and symbolic domain to distinguish between explanations that function in an everyday context and the more stringent explanations required in school.
That learning is not in fact a question of abandoning reasoning that works in the life-world domain for the more stringent scientific explanations used in school is one of Säljö's (1995) criticisms of the conclusions drawn from the results of pupils' achievement in NuNA (1993) . From a sociocultural perspective, Säljö discusses a question used in the NuNA to assess pupils' understanding of photosynthesis and ecological processes: "Think about an animal in the forest. It is composed of many atoms. The animal dies and starts to rot. What will happen to the atoms as the animal rots and finally disappears? Explain your reasoning" (our translation). One of the purposes of the question is to ascertain to what extent pupils use atomistic explanatory models for explaining fundamental biological processes. A summary of the main findings in NuNA regarding this question is presented in Table 1 .
As we can see, in only 5% of the cases are the pupils' responses wholly correct from a scientific perspecReasoning About Scientific Phenomena 201 of schools for deaf pupils differ from the situation for hearing pupils, and if so, how?
Theoretical Background
A survey of the literature shows that research on deaf children's learning focuses mainly on language acquisition. Very little of the literature concerns the teaching and learning of science in the educational environments of deaf pupils.
Results of science education research during the past couple of decades show that many hearing pupils experience school science as difficult to grasp, or unrelated to their daily lives and uninteresting. Science education has increasingly focused on questions concerning the interaction between science, language, and communication in learning situations. Below, we present lines of research in science education that have served as points of departure for this study.
Alternative Frameworks and Learning as Conceptual Change
During the 1970s and 1980s, studies on pupils' understanding of science and "levels of difficulty" were clearly inspired by the work of Piaget. Cognitive development in terms of Piaget's theory of stages was used as a possible theoretical base for developing science curricula adjusted to pupils' developmental levels (Shayer & Adey, 1981) . Parallel with the criticism of Piaget's stage theory, research has concentrated more on pupils' reasoning on different topics related to science subjects. This line of research has resulted in extensive surveys of pupils' alternative ways of describing scientific phenomena (Pfundt & Duit, 1994) . Pupils' intuitive conceptions and explanations, which often do not correspond to the scientific explanations presented in school, have been viewed as "misconceptions" or "preconceptions" rooted in the learners' alternative frameworks. Findings from this line of research have been used to produce material to test science achievement, both nationally (the 1992 National Evaluation of Compulsory School, here called NuNA, 1993) and internationally (for example, in the international assessment TIMSS, 1996) . Several studies show that pupils' alternative reasoning is often intact even after they have tive (category F). The majority of pupils (63%, categories D and E) apply the same reasoning to the atoms as they do to the macroscopic phenomenon (both the animal and the atoms rot away), or they fail to state explicitly that the question concerns a chemical reaction expressed as an acceptable scientific explanation.
According to Säljö, however, the way the question is formulated invites the pupils to answer in a genre characterized by everyday language and reasoning. Answers such as "atoms die/rot" cannot therefore be taken as evidence of pupils' misconceptions, but rather has to do with the choice of language used in a specific test situation.
Learning as Becoming Socialized to a Culture Aikenhead (1996) suggests that it is possible to regard learning science as a cultural acquisition. The learner has to understand and accept the subculture of science and "the norms, values, beliefs, expectations, and conventional actions of a group" (p. 8). Learning science for many pupils involves crossing borders between the many subcultures to which they belong in such contexts as the family, peer group, or school. Aikenhead argues in favor of a science instruction that makes visible the border crossing between a life-world domain and the symbolic domain, with their different ways of reasoning and different kinds of explanations.
The view that to learn science is to become socialized to a particular culture is also evident in a study by Ogborn, Kress, Martins, and McGillicuddy (1996) .
The authors describe a structure of classroom interaction and sequential events characterizing science lessons. A step toward getting pupils to participate in scientific reasoning is to put the phenomena that they are familiar with in a life-world context into a different framework-in this case, a framework based on scientific theories and methods. In this phase of "opening up differences," teachers in their classroom practice create tension between life-world reasoning and the formal explanations used in school science. In reference to the classroom dialogue between pupils and teachers, the authors say that "the difference becomes . . . a matter of difference between cultures" (Ogburn et al., p. 21).
The presentation above may illustrate how the focus in research in science education has shifted from pupils' conceptions of individual topics in science subjects to questions concerning science, communication of science, and the learners' participation in scientific discourses.
This Study in Relation to Previous Research
Results from NuNA may serve as a basis for comparing possible differences between how hearing and deaf pupils use scientific concepts, models, and theories in their reasoning on questions designed to assess scientific understanding.
Whether variation in pupils' reasoning could be a result of contextualization was not a major concern in the NuNa assessment. It was conducted solely as a pen-and-paper test. The question is whether what the report as a lack of understanding could instead reflect the pupils' attempts to adjust to a change of linguistic genre. In NuNA the question was presented in a penand-paper test. In this study, it was presented through a dialogue, and we framed the question in different contexts by asking additional questions such as "How do you think a scientist would answer this question?" and "How would you explain to a younger brother or sister that dead animals eventually disappear?" The purpose of using different contexts for discussing the science problem was to see whether the pupils could adjust their explanations to fit specific contexts. The pupils were asked to write down their answers individually and then to discuss and compare them in the group. The interviewer, who was present but remained passive during the discussion, posed questions to the pupils after the discussion.
The discussion and group interview were videotaped and subsequently transcribed. The analysis initially focused on the extent to which pupils used scientific concepts and models in attempting to answer the question. Further analysis aimed at identifying whether the pupils presented links between different domains, that is, between different school subjects and between school subjects and everyday contexts.
Step 2 The results from the group interview were then used as the basis for the next step, which consisted of individual interviews with seven 17-year-old pupils in grade 10 from two special schools for deaf children. The 10th grade teachers were asked to select pupils across the range of successful to less successful based on the pupils' marks. Four boys and three girls were interviewed.
The question from NuNA was used again to trigger the pupils' reasoning process. As a further triggering mechanism, we conducted a chemistry experiment demonstrating the combustion of magnesium. This experiment is commonly used in Swedish science education as an illustration of chemical reactions. We included this experiment in this step because one of the pupils in the first step had used it to explain the recycling of matter.
Also, the individual interviews were videotaped and
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NuNa categorized as misconceptions or lack of understanding might in fact be a result of contextualization, that is, of the pupils adjusting to what they perceived to be questions framed in a life-world domain rather than a scientific domain.
In this study, we use results from NuNA to make comparisons between hearing pupils' and deaf pupils' reasoning on questions about particular phenomena. Research that presents learning as a process of socialization to a culture and as reflecting the ability to operate in different domains is used as a point of departure in our analysis of the results.
Purpose of the Study
The overall purpose of the project, in which this study is a part, is to plan and implement an education program for teachers of deaf and hard-of-hearing pupils in science and mathematics. Findings from research in science education are nearly always based on studies with hearing children. Consequently, for the purpose of this project, we must ascertain if there are differences between how hearing and deaf pupils reason about science. The purpose of this study, then, is to acquire empirical data on deaf children's ways of explaining and reasoning about scientific phenomena.
Method
The study was conducted through interviews and carried out in two steps.
Step 1
In
Step 1 we made a group interview with three 15-year-old pupils in grade 8 from a special school for deaf and hard-of-hearing children. The group consisted of two boys and one girl.
The test question from NuNA (1993), quoted above, was presented both in written Swedish and orally by the interviewer through an interpreter in SSL. By using the question from NuNA, we were able to compare how hearing and deaf pupils reason about science. A criticism of the findings and conclusions in the NuNA-reports and of the science problem we chose for this study is that what is interpreted in the transcribed. The analysis focused initially on to what extent pupils used scientific concepts and models in their explanations and to what extent they adjusted to a change of context; that is, the interviewer framed the questions in both a scientific context and a life-world context. The pupils' statements were then ordered in categories and subcategories describing what we perceived as the pupils' main line of reasoning in the interviews. Selection of the categories was based on logical analysis and goodness of fit to lines of reasoning in the research tradition, in which learning is described as a process of operating in different domains. To further check the usefulness of the categories and ensuing results, we enlisted the aid of people from the special school for deaf and hard-of-hearing pupils, who have an insider perspective.
We both conducted the interviews. We both have a theoretical background in science and in research on the teaching of science and on pupils' learning of science. In the first stages of planning the education program, we had little knowledge of Swedish sign language. Therefore, Kia Norell, who is deaf and uses sign language, collaborated with us. She has worked as a mathematics and science teacher in two special schools for deaf and hard-of-hearing pupils. Her educational background is in mathematics, physics, and teacher education. The collaboration with Kia Norell has been of central importance for the study, as she has been able to provide valuable comments to strengthen the analysis and presentation of results.
All the interviews were conducted with the help of interpreters from the SIE. The necessity of doing the interviews through interpreters to compensate for our lack of knowledge of SSL posed certain problems. No matter how skilled the interpreter, utterances from both interviewer and interviewee are filtered through a third person's cognition, which increases the risk for misunderstandings and misinterpretations.
To reduce this risk, utterances and questions were presented in Swedish to one of the two interpreters, who then used sign language to convey the statements to the second interpreter. The second interpreter presented the statements in Swedish back to the interviewer. This procedure made it possible to check whether the initial statement had changed in content or structure through interpretation from Swedish into SSL and back again into Swedish. We were thereby able to identify translation problems and instances when additional clarification was called for during the interviews.
We hope that by preparing for the interviews in this manner and by exercising caution in interpreting individual utterances in the analysis of the interviews, we have reduced the risk of arriving at unsubstantiated conclusions.
We make no claim to widespread generality of this study's results: the study is exploratory, the sample of students is small, and the range of science topics covered is narrow. Nevertheless, the findings give us cause to reflect on how deaf and hard-of-hearing children are introduced to science and how they are taught science in special schools.
Results
We found both differences and similarities in how deaf and hearing pupils reason about science. Below, we present excerpts from the interviews to illustrate our grounds for categorization. We begin by presenting the outcome of the group interview, followed by the outcome of the individual interviews; last, we summarize the findings.
The markings used in the transcription are as follows. A "jump" to another passage of the interview is illustrated by [. .] . Instances where we do not write out affirmative comments such as "yes" or "mm," or nodding or shaking the head, are marked by a slash (/). A short period of silence or hesitation is marked by two dots (. .), and a longer period of silence or hesitation by four dots (. . . .). The interviewer is indicated by the initial "I."
Results From the Group Interview Our purpose in making the group interview was to participate in the pupils' spontaneous discussion and to record the understanding they arrived at collectively. The pupils had earlier been given the opportunity to formulate their explanations individually. However, the pattern of communication in the group interview developed in a direction we had not anticipated; one of themselves do not change. This corresponds to the scientific notion of matter as indestructible. In an attempt to explain his reasoning to his classmates, Alan spontaneously draws a parallel to what happens in a chemical reaction between magnesium and oxygen. His way of reasoning can be summarized as follows: there is a transfer, both between the school-science context and the everyday context, and between different disciplines within the school context. He draws almost immediately on biological/ecological concepts and models in his explanation and uses examples from another science, chemistry, to illustrate his reasoning. Alan's reasoning would undoubtedly have been categorized as an "F" in the NuNA test.
Results From the Individual Interviews
Based on our experiences from the first group interview, we decided to do a follow-up using individual interviews. Besides asking pupils to reason about the task involving "the dead animal in the forest," the experiment with magnesium was included to ascertain if other pupils would, as Alan did, make a similar connection between biological reasoning and chemistry.
It is interesting to compare Alan's coherent reasoning about the atomistic structure of matter with David's line of reasoning. David uses scientific concepts and models in his explanation, but the picture that emerges in the interview is somewhat more disjointed. He says that the atoms "contract" and form molecules. The interviewer asks David how he thinks atoms "contract," to which David replies: D: The first step is that they . . an atom gets split up and then they contract into . . molecules and then . . well . . they . . they disappear too . . I think. They sort of . . the second step is that they disappear [. .] why, they have to disappear because the animal sort of disappears / I mean, you can't see it any more.
David says that the atoms and molecules "have to disappear" because the animal has vanished from sight. It seems reasonable to assume that the logic behind his reasoning is that organisms consist of atoms and since the animal has disappeared, the atoms must also have disappeared, perhaps by forming molecules. This There are gaps in David's argument from a science perspective. For example, he does not see physical growth as the result of an increase in the number of atoms in the body. It is rather difficult to grasp his reasoning that the animal's disappearance is synonymous with the disappearance of the atoms. From a scientific perspective, David's way of reasoning gives obscure answers to questions such as "Where do the atoms go?" or "How do they form molecules?" When shown the magnesium experiment, David is able spontaneously to identify the process as a chemical reaction, but does not elaborate on the connection between atoms and molecules. Nor does he recognize chemical reactions as linked to the discussion of the disappearance of the dead animal. David does, to some extent, shift the question concerning the dead animal to a scientific context and uses scientific reasoning when giving his explanation, but he fails to use the connections between biological and chemical reasoning.
In the other six individual interviews, there is an even wider gap between the life-world context, here represented by the science problem concerning the dead animal, and scientific reasoning. A common feature of the interviews is that scientific reasoning does not enter the picture at all. Nevertheless, our way of interpreting the pupils' statements enables us to group From a scientific perspective, the science problem is framed within a network of theories and models of atomic structure, indestructible nature of matter, and recycling. In the interview with Elisa, we cannot see that she makes any reference to the microscopic level (the atoms) in her explanation. When she says that perhaps the animal gets eaten up by other animals, she is referring only to the animal itself (at the macroscopic level). At this level the question does not call for an explanation, the animal "rots by itself." Her way of reasoning is shared by other pupils. One boy says, for example, that rot "occurs automatically." Our interpretation of these statements is that the pupils do not see the possible connections between a life-world context and school science, nor between different scientific disciplines. This interpretation is supported by Elisa's reply when we ask her what hearing the word atom brings to mind, in connection with the burning of magnesium experiment conducted during the interview. E: Atom, that's in the atomic bomb. That's what I think about, and then there is something in physics, something to do with atoms, too. Something red and white and black . . some sort of ball. I: I see. Has it got something to do with chemistry, too?
Have you met up with it in chemistry? models to explain the problem. Instead, they place the phenomena within a life-world discourse where action is required to solve the problem.
"I used to know, but I've forgotten." In some of the interviews with this group of six pupils, their statements could initially be placed in the category "What is the problem?": the animal will rot, some parts of the skeleton will remain, and it might start to smell bad. In his explanation Henry begins by saying that the process occurs automatically, but when gently urged to give an explanation, he says that he has too little information and that he has forgotten. As long as we talk about the macroscopic phenomenon, the animal, he sticks to a life-world way of reasoning: "dead animals rot, and that's it." When we ask Henry what kind of explanation he thinks a scientist might give to the same question, he replies: H: Mm . . well, they'd know, wouldn't they. And maybe. . . . no, I don't know. Maybe I didn't get very much information about this, and that's why I don't know.
It would have been reasonable to expect more of a mixture between life-world and school-science explanations here; for example, "The atoms rot or disappear together with the animal," which 26% of the pupils replied in the NuNA study (Category D).
What is striking in this study is the almost total absence of all such statements. A common feature, here represented by Henry's response, was descriptions that could be categorized as "Either you know it or you don't." His statements, and those of the other pupils, can be seen as an acknowledgment of his own shallow In the individual interviews, six of the seven pupils state explicitly that atoms are connected with the school subjects chemistry and/or physics. Two of them also associate atoms with bombs or nuclear weapons, and a third with bombs and poisons in nature. However, none of the pupils applies a scientific model or refers to atoms and molecules in attempts to explain what happens to a dead animal. Instead, like Elisa, they explain the disappearance of the dead animal with other animals having perhaps eaten it, or they simply say that the animals just rotted away and disappeared. This is commented on as a natural process that does not require further explanation. "Let's take care of the problem. " Some of the pupils may see both the question about the dead animal and the burning of magnesium as problems, but in a way that calls, not for reasoning, but for action. We ask Fred what will happen to the dead animal after it has been lying there for a while. He replies: Fred: . . Well, maybe I could bring it to a vet or someone to check that it really is dead. [. .] If it's still lying there, it means that . . other animals will eat it. And the parts that are left over, well they'll start to smell bad or . . maybe someone who has that job will take it away and burn it or something.
During the magnesium experiment, we ask Gwen, "What happens when something burns like this?" She replies:
G: What happens when it burns? Well, you would have to put it out. And . . either pour water on it or smother it in some way.
In this case, perhaps it would be possible to interpret the pupils' responses as indicating that they quite understand that the test question and experiment pose certain problems. However, as with our category "There is no problem," the pupils do not frame the phenomena in a scientific discourse using theories and knowledge in science, which would be fair enough. Perhaps somewhat more surprising, and, in this context, more interesting, is how little science seems to have infiltrated the pupils' life-world reasoning. Our interpretation of the pupils' statements is that, for them, life-world reasoning and scientific reasoning are two quite separate, nonintercommunicating spheres of knowledge. This supposition is supported by the statements referred to above, in which the pupils refer to scientific concepts like atoms as belonging to science disciplines but having very little to do with what takes place in the real world.
These students' reasoning would probably have been categorized as a "C" in the NuNA test, as they do not explain the phenomena in a scientific sense.
Summary of the Interviews
If the results in this study are compared with the results in NuNA, we find differences in how hearing pupils and deaf pupils reason in science. However, we must take great care in making comparisons: NuNa was a pen-and-paper test in which a large number of pupils participated, whereas this study is an exploratory interview study with a small number of pupils and few science topics. With these cautionary words in mind, we propose the following categorization of the pupils in this study, using the NuNA categories as a basis (see Table 2 ).
In NuNA, a majority (63%) of the pupils' reasoning was judged as indicative of category D or E. In this
study we do not deny that concepts such as atoms come into play in a sense that would justify categorizing the pupils' responses as D or E, except in David's case. According to our interpretation, the majority of the pupils' responses fall into category "C" because the pupils do not use the concepts and models of natural science in their explanations. This is not to assert that deaf pupils are less scientific in their reasoning because they have less cognitive ability. Rather, our intention here is to explore a possible difference between how hearing and deaf pupils are introduced to science, in a life-world domain as well as in the formal symbolic domain of the school.
Summarizing the interviews using the categories developed in this study shows a variation in how the pupils we interviewed reason. We can range their statements along a continuum, with Alan at one end and a group of six pupils at the other. Below, we give our interpretation of this continuum, as illustrated in Table  3 . Beryl and Charles (the two pupils who participated in the group interview with Alan) are excluded, as they more or less let Alan take the initiative.
Alan frames the question in a scientific context and uses biological theories and models in his explanation. He spontaneously uses knowledge from chemistry to clarify his way of reasoning to his two classmates. Thus, Alan accomplishes the transfer between different contexts, that is, between the life-world domain (assuming that the question about the dead animal can be regarded as such) and the symbolic domain of school science. He also accomplishes the transfer between different contexts within school science, that is, by us- these pupils as indicating that concepts like the atoms belong to the science discourse, or the science culture, and these pupils are not members of that culture.
Discussion
We reported that the overall purpose of the project at SIE is to acquire a foundation for planning an education program for teachers of deaf pupils in mathematics and science. A part of this foundation is to understand how pupils make sense of science and to what extent they use scientific theories, models, and concepts in their reasoning. We realize that the findings and our interpretations, based on the interviews in this study, are inconclusive. We conducted only a small number of interviews, and some of the pupils may have perceived the interview situation as, if not frightening, at least "peculiar." Because of our insufficient knowledge of SSL, the interviews were conducted through interpreters, which adds to the risk for misunderstandings. What we, as scientists and researchers, experienced as a shift of contextualization might not have been perceived that way by the pupils. Again, we must emphasize that this study, because of its exploratory design, the small number of participating pupils, and the limited range of science topics covered, does not allow us to make farreaching generalizations.
However, we argue that the interviews do show: (1) a variation with regard to how the pupils use science theories, models, and concepts for reasoning about the presented phenomena and (2) examples of the failure to make connections between different science subjects (in this case not using chemical reasoning to explain Mainly no reasoning within a symbolic school-science domain.
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ing knowledge from chemistry to elucidate his reasoning in biology.
David occupies an intermediate position in the study. His logical reasoning (i.e., if the animal disappears, the atoms have to disappear, too) is not fully supported by links between concepts and models within the science disciplines. Moreover, he makes no connection between chemistry and biology.
If we regard Alan as a member of the science culture, it seems reasonable to present David as a not yet fully socialized member of the same science culture. He uses some of the right language and perceives some of the connections in scientific reasoning, but does not get all the pieces of the puzzle to fit together.
At the other end of the continuum we find the majority of the pupils in this study. A main feature of the responses by Fred, Gwen, and the others is that neither the dead animal question nor the magnesium experiment elicits scientific reasoning. The phenomena are viewed either as problems to be solved through action of some kind rather than through explanation, or are not viewed as problems at all: "dead animals rot; that's what dead animals do." It seems reasonable to suppose that, for these pupils, life-world phenomena are treated within a life-world context and school science has little to do with the world outside the classroom. It could be argued that the pupils who did not include scientific concepts in their reasoning have actually framed the question in an everyday context and consequently used words that did not call for scientific reasoning. However, during the interviews, we also reframed the question in a scientific context, and it seems unlikely that pupils would not have responded accordingly if they had the tools to do so. We interpret the statements of biological processes). These findings are by no means unique. Similar results have been reported in studies on hearing pupils' scientific reasoning (cf. Driver et al., 1994) . However, particularly noteworthy in our study is the group of six pupils whom we regard as having, in a sense, "rejected science." We regard Aikenhead's (1966) argument that learning science is similar to becoming socialized to a culture as being fruitful for a discussion on learning and using science. Within this framework, Alan could probably be considered a distinguished member of the science culture for persons of his age, in any context. David might be regarded as being on the way to becoming acquainted with the rules, norms, and values of the group, but is not yet a full member.
The main interest in this study concerns the six pupils whom we regard as nonmembers of the scientific community. The pupils' responses vary on certain points, but they all point in a similar direction: science does not come into play in their reasoning.
A concept like atoms is described as "some sort of ball," and it "belongs to" the subjects of chemistry and physics. Questions that, in a scientific sense, can be regarded as problems are in fact perceived by these pupils as "nonproblems" or as problems requiring action rather than explanations. When prompted to present scientific arguments, the pupils responded by saying, "I've learnt this but forgotten it" or "I'm not very good at this." We see little evidence of their mixing scientific reasoning with life-world reasoning. We interpret the statements as illustrating that this group of pupils regards science (with its words, models, and theories) as something entirely different from, and in fact irrelevant in, their world. If this supposition is correct, it raises a number of questions.
Why does science have such a negligible effect on pupils' ways of reasoning? Compared with hearing pupils, do deaf pupils experience school science as even more unintelligible and unrelated to their lives? Testing this hypothesis would probably involve comparing how hearing pupils, on one hand, and deaf and hard-ofhearing pupils, on the other, encounter science in a lifeworld domain and how science instruction in school is designed for these respective pupil categories.
Hearing pupils meet a popularized version of science through media such as science magazines and, probably more important, science programs on television designed especially for adolescents and the general public. Even if media explanations of particular phenomena often lack scientific depth, children meet scientific terminology and explanations outside the school context-and, by all means, in an attractive form. It seems plausible that these confrontations with popularized science stimulate both thinking and discussion with friends and family. Questions arise to tickle the imagination: how come a bird or an airplane can fly? Why isn't it possible to dive to the bottom of the ocean? Do present weather disasters have anything to do with the ozone hole, and what is an ozone hole, anyway?
Even if the questions do not always elicit stringent scientific explanations, they might generate a process of reflection on "how things work." Deaf children are generally excluded from this way of meeting science. Few television programs in Swedish are subtitled. And if they were, younger children would be unable to read the texts, and the speaker voices would have to be signed, which in turn would divide the child's attention between the televised images and the person doing the signing. Under such circumstances, television programs would be hard to follow. If the scenario presented above is at all credible, it follows that deaf children's initial meeting with science actually takes place mostly in school, and then from a stricter scientific perspective. Ogborn et al. (1996) suggest that some parts of science lessons can "open up the difference" between reasoning in the world outside school and reasoning within the frames of school science. Opening up differences by negotiating different explanations of topics in science is one phase of the process of being socialized to the science culture. It then seems reasonable to suggest that a prerequisite for the negotiation is that pupils perceive the alternative scientific explanation as valid in relation to the topic discussed. In other words, the negotiation organized by the teacher would have to be arranged, and contain elements, such that pupils actually perceive both the similarities (the topic or phenomenon) and the differences (the alternative ways of reasoning or explaining the topic or phenomenon).
To deaf and hard-of-hearing children, it is reasonable to assume that the gap between science and alter-native reasoning is greater than it is for hearing children because they have had less exposure to informal science. If this gap is too wide, it could mean that the necessary tension between alternative explanations is not generated. This could mean in turn that, in the best case, pupils memorize the theories, models, and concepts of school science, or, in the worst case, that they perceive the culture of science as boring, uninteresting, of little relevance to their lives and therefore reject it. If our reasoning is correct, it follows that instruction for deaf and hard-of-hearing pupils must take into account, to a much greater extent than now, the relationship between scientific reasoning and preinstructional reasoning.
As a consequence of the above exposition, the next phase of the project will study classroom interaction in science lessons. Among the questions we will examine are these: what do the pupils bring to the more formal science taught in school? What kind of informal science reasoning do deaf and hard-of-hearing children encounter outside the school context? How is science reasoning introduced and negotiated in special schools for deaf and hard-of-hearing pupils?
Another question raised by the group interview concerns the relationship between scientific vocabulary and SSL. Alan uses the sign for seconds when he talks about atoms, since there is no accepted sign for atom. Beryl gets puzzled about how "seconds" got into the discussion on atoms and dead animals. In this particular case, the confusion was quickly cleared up, but in other instances the absence of uniform signs could pose a serious problem, especially in science subjects where the meanings of concepts are often stringently defined. In Sweden, most of the pupils from the five special compulsory schools continue their upper secondary education at the State Upper Secondary School for the Deaf (Riksgymnasiet för Döva) in Ö rebro. If pupils from different compulsory schools use different signs for the same phenomenon or concept, this will likely lead to confusion and misunderstanding. In the first phase of the project, we will try to document possible variations in SSL regarding scientific concepts.
